the-competitor-dossier

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves and processes untrusted external content from the web, which represents a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious instructions are hidden in data.
  • Ingestion points: The skill uses WebFetch to read competitor homepages and pricing pages, and WebSearch to ingest reviews and news. It also processes user-provided inputs such as "pasted exports" or tool stack descriptions.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions in references/agent-security.md provide natural language boundaries, directing the agent to treat all retrieved content strictly as data, use quoting for reporting, and explicitly ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes WebFetch and WebSearch. It does not have shell execution, file-writing, or network-post capabilities enabled in the frontmatter configuration.
  • Sanitization: There are explicit requirements to report injection attempts as findings rather than obeying them, and to redact any detected credentials from output.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to handle potentially sensitive inputs such as CRM exports and call transcripts, which may contain hardcoded credentials.
  • Evidence: Rule 2 in references/agent-security.md establishes a protocol for the agent to detect, flag, and avoid echoing API keys, session tokens, or passwords found in the data, recommending rotation instead of reproduction.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses platform-provided tools to fetch content from external URLs as part of its core functionality.
  • Evidence: The YAML frontmatter permits the use of WebFetch and WebSearch to download and process content from competitor websites and third-party review platforms.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 14, 2026, 12:03 PM