signoz-explaining-alerts
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes alert metadata, including names, descriptions, and labels, along with query configurations fetched from the SigNoz platform. This ingested data is external and potentially untrusted. A malicious user with the ability to modify alerts in SigNoz could insert instructions designed to influence the agent's output when the skill identifies and explains those alerts.
- Ingestion points: Metadata is retrieved through the
signoz_get_alert,signoz_list_alert_rules, andsignoz_get_alert_historytools. - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are used when the agent processes alert configuration details.
- Capability inventory: The skill is restricted to read-only SigNoz tools for fetching alert details and history.
- Sanitization: The instructions do not mandate sanitizing or escaping the text content of alerts before it is presented in the final explanation.
Audit Metadata