dig-deeper-core
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external diagnostic data (evidence) which represents a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The
Troubleshooterrole collects data from the system/environment to build evidence tables as described inreferences/troubleshooter.md. - Boundary markers: The framework uses a mandatory 'authority profile' to delimit what data can be accessed. The
Interrogatorrole specifically audits these boundaries as defined inreferences/interrogator.md. - Capability inventory: The skill can execute 'probes' for evidence collection but contains strict 'Non-Negotiables' in
SKILL.mdthat prevent remediation or execution of fixes. - Sanitization: The
Interrogatorcontext acts as a logic-based audit layer, validating that every claim traces to numbered evidence and checking for authority violations before passing a diagnosis. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The framework allows for running 'probes' to collect evidence, which involves executing system commands or tool calls.
- Execution is restricted to diagnostic purposes only and is governed by the supplied authority profile provided by the wrapper.
- The skill includes an explicit instruction: 'It never implements or executes remediation without a separate explicit user request,' ensuring that the command execution capability is not used for unauthorized modifications.
- [SAFE]: The skill configuration in
agents/openai.yamlexplicitly disables implicit invocation, ensuring that the tool only runs when intentionally called by the system or user.
Audit Metadata