dig-deeper-core

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external diagnostic data (evidence) which represents a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The Troubleshooter role collects data from the system/environment to build evidence tables as described in references/troubleshooter.md.
  • Boundary markers: The framework uses a mandatory 'authority profile' to delimit what data can be accessed. The Interrogator role specifically audits these boundaries as defined in references/interrogator.md.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute 'probes' for evidence collection but contains strict 'Non-Negotiables' in SKILL.md that prevent remediation or execution of fixes.
  • Sanitization: The Interrogator context acts as a logic-based audit layer, validating that every claim traces to numbered evidence and checking for authority violations before passing a diagnosis.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The framework allows for running 'probes' to collect evidence, which involves executing system commands or tool calls.
  • Execution is restricted to diagnostic purposes only and is governed by the supplied authority profile provided by the wrapper.
  • The skill includes an explicit instruction: 'It never implements or executes remediation without a separate explicit user request,' ensuring that the command execution capability is not used for unauthorized modifications.
  • [SAFE]: The skill configuration in agents/openai.yaml explicitly disables implicit invocation, ensuring that the tool only runs when intentionally called by the system or user.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 7, 2026, 06:51 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — dig-deeper-core