ping-pong
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill operates by having a coordinator and subagents ingest and modify external data, such as task briefs, project instructions, and implementation artifacts. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious content in these files could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The coordinator reads external "task and applicable project instructions" and "existing work" (SKILL.md). Subagents and the reviewer process the "artifact" (the deliverable being worked on).
- Capability inventory: The workflow explicitly authorizes the "driver" subagent to "run commands that mutate shared state" and "edit the deliverable." The coordinator uses "delegation tools" to spawn and manage subagents.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of strict delimiters or sanitization protocols to distinguish between agent instructions and the external data being processed.
- Sanitization: There are no instructions for escaping or filtering untrusted content before it is processed by the subagents or the reviewer.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The driver subagent is instructed to run commands to implement slices and perform checks. This capability, while necessary for the skill's primary purpose of pair programming, represents a potential execution vector if the deliverable or the instructions processed by the agent are compromised.
Audit Metadata