material-retrieve
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from a local writing material library, which could contain hidden instructions designed to manipulate the agent when the content is retrieved and displayed.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested from
./writing-workspace/materials/index.jsonland content files located in./writing-workspace/materials/entries/. - Boundary markers: The skill uses markdown blockquotes (
>) to wrap the retrieved content, which is a weak boundary that may not prevent an LLM from following instructions embedded in the text. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to read any file within the specified materials directory in the local workspace.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or specific system instructions to ignore embedded commands within the retrieved materials.
Audit Metadata