cast
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting potentially untrusted data from repository files and external signals to synthesize persona attributes.
- Ingestion points: Data is sourced from project files (README, documentation, source code, and tests) and handoffs from upstream agents (Field, Trace, Voice) as specified in
reference/generation-workflows.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not instruct the agent to use delimiters or specific ignore-instructions logic when processing these inputs.
- Capability inventory: The agent can perform file system writes (
.agents/personas/), execute local utility commands, and interact with network-based text-to-speech APIs. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of content filtering or sanitization of input data prior to persona generation.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on several well-known external libraries and services for its core functionality.
- Evidence: References to the
edge-ttspackage vianpxand dependencies likepandasandscikit-learnfor data clustering inreference/segmentation-methods.md. - Context: These are standard industry tools for text-to-speech and data analysis and are considered safe under established development practices.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local system commands to manage the environment and verify dependencies.
- Evidence: Usage of
curl,which, andnpxto check for the presence of theVOICEVOXserver and the macOSsayutility inreference/speak-engine.md.
Audit Metadata