skills/simota/agent-skills/lore/Gen Agent Trust Hub

lore

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its core functionality of harvesting insights from agent journals and logs.
  • Ingestion points: During the HARVEST phase, the skill reads full entries from .agents/*.md, Triage postmortems, and Mend remediation logs.
  • Boundary markers: While the skill employs semantic similarity thresholds (e.g., >=80% for clustering) and confidence scoring, it lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore potential command-like patterns within the harvested data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to update the central METAPATTERNS.md knowledge base and propagate findings via LORE_INSIGHT and LORE_ALERT signals to critical agents such as Architect, Darwin, and Nexus, which could lead to cross-agent instruction poisoning.
  • Sanitization: There is no documented mechanism for sanitizing or escaping the unstructured content extracted from the journals before it is synthesized into patterns or propagated.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 22, 2026, 12:16 PM