nexus
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The framework has a significant exposure to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Several recipes, such as
newsroom(reference/newsroom-recipe.md),eureka(reference/eureka-recipe.md), andresearch-grounding(reference/research-grounding.md), usefield,compete, anddeep-researchagents to performWebSearchandWebFetchoperations on untrusted external web content. - Boundary markers: The skill employs a 'Specified Brief' mechanism (
reference/specify-phase.md) to harden instructions before delegation. However, this is primarily intended for clarity and intent preservation rather than sanitizing untrusted external data. - Capability inventory: The orchestrator can execute complex code changes and system modifications through specialized implementation agents like
Builder,Artisan, andNative, which are then automatically verified by separate testing agents. - Sanitization: The skill relies on 'Adversarial Refutation' (
_common/ADVERSARIAL_REFUTATION.md) and 'Skeptic Panels' to detect misinformation or logical errors in the gathered content, which is a judgment-based defense rather than a deterministic security control against hidden prompt instructions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The core functionality of the skill involves executing shell commands and spawning autonomous sub-agents across Claude Code, Codex, and Antigravity (agy) environments. This is documented in detail in
reference/execution-layers.mdandreference/orchestration-patterns.md, and is the intended purpose of the orchestration plane. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and fetches information from established technology domains and documentation sites (e.g.,
code.claude.com,github.com) to maintain platform compatibility and verify standards. These represent well-known and trusted services used for legitimate administrative and informational purposes.
Audit Metadata