image-generate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user-provided text for image prompts and filenames which are subsequently embedded into shell command strings for tools like agy and codex.
  • Ingestion points: The Prompt and ImageName fields in reference/agy-imagen.md and reference/codex-imagen.md serve as entry points for untrusted data entering the agent's context.
  • Boundary markers: There are no documented boundary markers or instructions to the agent to ignore or escape embedded shell control characters within the prompt strings.
  • Capability inventory: The agent is granted Bash access and the ability to execute various scripts (recipe.py, imgfacts.py).
  • Sanitization: The instructions lack any requirement for sanitizing, escaping, or validating the input data before it is interpolated into shell commands.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill operates by invoking various CLI utilities via shell execution to manage external generators and sidecar metadata.
  • Evidence includes shell command templates in reference/agy-imagen.md and reference/codex-imagen.md that use positional parameters from user input.
  • The documentation for the agy generator encourages the use of the --dangerously-skip-permissions flag to bypass internal permission prompts.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Command lines are constructed at runtime by concatenating base commands with parameters derived from the user's request, creating an exploitable path for potential command injection.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 3, 2026, 06:00 PM