eo-flow
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 24, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute the
codexcommand with the--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxflag. This explicitly disables security guardrails, allowing the agent to perform privileged operations and filesystem access without user approval or environmental restrictions. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The 'Callback Contract' mechanism involves the dynamic generation and injection of shell commands (using
tmux-bridge messageandtmux-bridge keys) into separate execution contexts (other tmux panes). This allows one agent process to execute arbitrary shell code in another process's environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically constructs shell commands using
tmuxandtmux-bridgebased on environment-derived variables like project names (fromgit rev-parse) and pane IDs. While some basic regex filtering is applied to project names, the overall execution model relies on shell execution of untrusted or environment-controlled strings. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through its automated decision-making process based on external file content.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads and processes the content of
review.md,test.md, andgit diffoutput to decide whether to 'auto-fix' or continue execution. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to treat the content of these files as data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands, manipulate tmux panes, and spawn new agents without sandboxes.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the content read from the workspace files before it influences the agent's logic flow.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata