eo-workflow
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The
start-panes.shscript launches sub-agents with flags that explicitly bypass security constraints. Claude is launched with--dangerously-skip-permissions, and Codex is executed with--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox. These flags disable user permission prompts, human-in-the-loop approvals, and execution sandboxing for the agents performing the workflow tasks.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill usestmux-bridgeto dynamically construct and send commands to multiple terminal panes. This orchestration allows the skill to programmatically interact with shell environments and other AI agents.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill features an indirect injection surface by reading content from markdown files (e.g.,spec.md,change.md,test.md) and using it to drive automated workflow decisions and command generation.\n - Ingestion points: Logic in
SKILL.mdreads and parses project documentation and status files to determine phase transitions.\n - Boundary markers: None identified; file content (like status values and review comments) is processed directly by the orchestrator.\n
- Capability inventory: Uses
tmux-bridgefor typing commands,tmuxfor pane control, andCronCreatefor periodic monitoring.\n - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of the data extracted from files before it influences command execution.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata