comprehensive-review-full-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to the lack of boundary markers when processing external data.
- Ingestion points: The $ARGUMENTS placeholder in SKILL.md is used to interpolate untrusted code directly into prompts for multiple sub-agents across all phases.
- Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters (such as XML tags or triple backticks with explicit ignore-instructions) used to separate the code being analyzed from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: Sub-agents (e.g., code-reviewer, security-auditor) are orchestrated using the Task tool and likely possess read access to the local filesystem to perform analysis.
- Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not implement any validation, escaping, or filtering of the input code before it is processed by the LLM sub-agents.
Audit Metadata