posthog-automation

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 25, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the configuration of an external MCP server at https://rube.app/mcp. This is a third-party endpoint not listed as a trusted or well-known service, introducing a dependency on external infrastructure.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By adding a remote MCP server, the agent delegates tool execution logic to a third-party service, which provides the underlying functionality for the PostHog automation tools.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates the transmission of analytics data and user events to external PostHog instances through the Rube MCP gateway.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests data from external PostHog APIs that could contain malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md identifies POSTHOG_LIST_AND_FILTER_PROJECT_EVENTS, POSTHOG_RETRIEVE_CURRENT_USER_PROFILE, and POSTHOG_RETRIEVE_FEATURE_FLAG_DETAILS as tools used to read external data into the agent context.
  • Boundary markers: Absent in SKILL.md. No delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are provided for processing retrieved data.
  • Capability inventory: SKILL.md details write capabilities including creating feature flags via POSTHOG_CREATE_FEATURE_FLAGS_FOR_PROJECT and capturing events via POSTHOG_CAPTURE_EVENT.
  • Sanitization: Absent in SKILL.md. The instructions do not mention validating or sanitizing retrieved event properties or user profile data before they are processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 25, 2026, 09:53 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — posthog-automation