brainstorming
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface because it ingests untrusted user input and interpolates it into prompts for secondary subagents.
- Ingestion points: User-controlled content is supplied via the
$brainstormingvariable as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters (such as XML tags) or safety instructions for subagents to ignore potentially malicious directives embedded within the user input.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes subagent spawning capabilities via
fork_turns: "none"inSKILL.mdto execute the dynamically generated prompts. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering, escaping, or validation of the user input before it is passed to the subagent logic.
Audit Metadata