delegate-ui-to-claude
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
npx --yes impeccable@latestto install and update theimpeccabletool directly from the NPM registry. While NPM is a standard service, the tool itself is not from a pre-defined trusted source. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions involve executing various CLI tools, including
npxandclaude. The skill follows security best practices by using standard input redirection from temporary files (e.g.,claude ... < /path/to/handoff.txt) rather than interpolating text into shell commands, which prevents command injection vulnerabilities. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a vulnerability surface where instructions embedded in external project data could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
PRODUCT.md, design documents, plans, and the current working-tree state to build handoff prompts. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the content being interpolated into the delegate prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes shell commands, writes files (e.g.,
PRODUCT.md), and launches a delegate agent with the ability to implement code and potentially access the network via theclaudeCLI. - Sanitization: The skill avoids shell interpolation by using file redirection for prompts, but it does not specify sanitization or validation of the text content extracted from design documents and project files.
- [SAFE]: The skill includes specific defensive instructions, such as verifying that cleanup targets are not symlinks and explicitly prohibiting the use of
--dangerously-skip-permissionsorbypassPermissionsflags.
Audit Metadata