sjskills
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to operate a command-line interface (CLI) tool named
sjskills. It instructs the agent to execute various subcommands includingstatus,plan,apply,init, andrestore. The instructions guide the agent to use either a system-installed version on thePATHor a local version located atbin/sjskillswithin the tool's source repository. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from project manifests (
sjskills.toml), status reports (plan.json), and external registries. - Ingestion points: External configuration files (
sjskills.toml), temporary plan artifacts generated by the CLI (plan.json), and content fetched from remote registries. - Boundary markers: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to "Review every operation, warning, current-state fact... before mutation" and to "Summarize the reviewed operations before applying," providing a layer of manual/cognitive boundary.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands via the
sjskillsbinary, as seen inSKILL.mdandreferences/global-rollout.md. - Sanitization: The skill employs integrity checks for global rollouts by requiring the agent to compute and verify SHA-256 digests of the plan artifacts (
--approved-plan-sha256), which mitigates the risk of processing tampered or malicious plan data.
Audit Metadata