sjskills

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to operate a command-line interface (CLI) tool named sjskills. It instructs the agent to execute various subcommands including status, plan, apply, init, and restore. The instructions guide the agent to use either a system-installed version on the PATH or a local version located at bin/sjskills within the tool's source repository.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from project manifests (sjskills.toml), status reports (plan.json), and external registries.
  • Ingestion points: External configuration files (sjskills.toml), temporary plan artifacts generated by the CLI (plan.json), and content fetched from remote registries.
  • Boundary markers: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to "Review every operation, warning, current-state fact... before mutation" and to "Summarize the reviewed operations before applying," providing a layer of manual/cognitive boundary.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands via the sjskills binary, as seen in SKILL.md and references/global-rollout.md.
  • Sanitization: The skill employs integrity checks for global rollouts by requiring the agent to compute and verify SHA-256 digests of the plan artifacts (--approved-plan-sha256), which mitigates the risk of processing tampered or malicious plan data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 8, 2026, 11:17 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — sjskills