source-investigator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it clones and parses source code from external repositories that could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: SKILL.md (Workflow Step 3) describes cloning repositories from external URLs.
- Boundary markers: Absent. The workflow does not instruct the agent or its subagents to use isolation markers or ignore instructions embedded in the source code.
- Capability inventory: SKILL.md (Workflow Steps 2 and 4) describes creating directories, modifying files, and spawning subagents to analyze code.
- Sanitization: Absent. Content fetched from external repositories is not sanitized before being read by subagents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes system-level commands to manage the environment and retrieve data.
- Evidence: Workflow steps in SKILL.md involve creating the
.tmp/directory, updating.gitignore, and runninggit clone. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to download remote codebases.
- Evidence: Workflow Step 3 in SKILL.md explicitly directs the agent to
git clonerepositories from user-provided or discovered URLs.
Audit Metadata