consult-mytech
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves technical preferences from an external source (the author's GitHub repository), creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions embedded in the guidance could attempt to influence the agent.
- Ingestion points: Technical preference documents and README files located in the
sjunepark/mytechrepository. - Boundary markers: The instructions in
SKILL.mdexplicitly state that local project requirements take precedence and that the skill should not expand its underlying task authority. - Capability inventory: The skill uses
gitand standard file system commands (cat,ls) to interact with the repository and local files, as evidenced by commands likegit rev-parse HEADandgit statusin the provided evaluation logs. - Sanitization: No explicit technical sanitization or filtering of the external content is described, though the skill is instructed to report coverage limits and missing sources.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Evaluation records (e.g.,
evals/cli-b.jsonandevals/missing-b.json) show the agent performing shell commands includinggit rev-parse HEAD,git status --short, andls -ldto manage and verify the state of the preference repository. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is configured to fetch data from a remote GitHub repository (
https://github.com/sjunepark/mytech). This is documented as a vendor-owned resource belonging to the skill author (sjunepark).
Audit Metadata