docx

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill performs runtime compilation and process injection to enable LibreOffice functionality in restricted environments.
  • The file scripts/office/soffice.py contains embedded C source code that implements a socket shim.
  • At runtime, the skill uses gcc to compile this C code into a shared object (.so) file stored in the temporary directory.
  • It then uses the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to inject this shim into the soffice process during execution.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses subprocess.run to execute several system-level command-line tools.
  • It calls soffice to process document changes and conversions.
  • It calls gcc to compile its internal compatibility shim.
  • It calls git diff to perform text-based comparisons during document validation.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes complex external data structures which presents an indirect injection surface.
  • Ingestion points: Office documents (.docx, .pptx, .xlsx) are unpacked, and their XML and relationship files are read into the agent context (in scripts/office/unpack.py).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not explicitly tell the agent to treat document content as untrusted text or to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including arbitrary file writing, execution of CLI tools, and runtime code compilation.
  • Sanitization: The skill mitigates common XML attacks by using the defusedxml library for parsing document components.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 02:40 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — docx