developer-growth-analysis
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the local
~/.claude/history.jsonlfile, which contains private developer logs, project context, and pasted source code. - Evidence: Step 1 instructions require the agent to read
~/.claude/history.jsonlto filter developer interactions from the past 48 hours. - Evidence: Step 7 instructions utilize the
Rube MCPtool to send a report containing summarized history data to an external Slack channel viaRUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted historical chat data from local logs, creating a potential vector for indirect prompt injection if those logs contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points:
~/.claude/history.jsonlaccessed in Step 1. - Boundary markers: Absent. No instructions are given to the agent to use delimiters or specifically ignore instructions that might be embedded within the project chat logs.
- Capability inventory: Includes network search capabilities via
RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLSand external messaging viaRUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not describe any sanitization, filtering, or validation of the history content before processing it for report generation.
Audit Metadata