internal-comms
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill relies on ingesting and summarizing data from multi-user environments, which introduces a potential vector for malicious actors to influence the agent's output through specially crafted content.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to gather information from Slack channels, Google Drive documents, Email communications, and Calendar events to draft newsletters, 3P updates, and FAQ responses (referenced in
examples/3p-updates.md,examples/company-newsletter.md, andexamples/faq-answers.md). - Boundary markers: There are no specific instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to treat external content as untrusted or to ignore instructions that might be embedded within those sources.
- Capability inventory: The skill directs the agent to search for and read potentially sensitive communications (e.g., leadership updates, critical project docs) and output summaries or newsletters directly to the user.
- Sanitization: The skill lacks any guidelines for validating or sanitizing the data retrieved from external tools before it is processed and presented.
Audit Metadata