open-slide-best-practices
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes 'inspector comments' embedded in JSX source code (
{/* @slide-comment ... */}). These markers contain base64url-encoded JSON with anotefield containing natural language instructions (e.g., 'make this heading bigger') that the agent is directed to execute as code edits in therules/apply-comments.mdworkflow. This creates a surface where malicious or unexpected instructions in a slide file could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: The agent reads
slides/<id>/index.tsxto find and decode these markers. - Boundary markers: Instructions are wrapped in JSX comment markers, but the agent is specifically told to decode and follow the inner
notetext. - Capability inventory: The skill assumes access to the
Edittool to modify React components in the slide files. - Sanitization: The instructions advise interpreting comments 'in context' and making 'reasonable' interpretations, but there is no formal validation or sanitization of the embedded instructions.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs project initialization using
npx @open-slide/cli init, which fetches and executes code from the npm registry. It also provides instructions for loading Hebrew fonts from Google Fonts (fonts.googleapis.com). These are well-known services and align with the skill's stated purpose. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill suggests using
node -eas a helper to decode base64url payloads from inspector markers and mentions standard project scripts likenpm run devandnpm run sync:skills. These are routine development operations within this framework's ecosystem.
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