ai-automation-workflows
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'Data Processing Pipeline' section provides a script that reads external file content (
cat $file) and interpolates it directly into an LLM prompt for thebeltCLI. This pattern lack markers to distinguish data from instructions, creating an indirect prompt injection surface. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Data Processing Pipeline script loop) - Boundary markers: Absent; untrusted file content is concatenated directly into the instruction string.
- Capability inventory: Command execution via
beltCLI for multiple AI services. - Sanitization: Absent; no validation or escaping of the ingested file content is performed.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The 'Error Alerting' script uses
curlto transmit command outputs and error messages to a non-whitelisted external domain (your-webhook.com). While a placeholder, this demonstrates a pattern for exfiltrating potentially sensitive execution results. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous Bash and Python scripts that utilize shell loops, background processes (
&), and process management (wait). While theallowed-toolsfrontmatter limits the agent to thebeltcommand, the provided examples suggest a broader range of required system capabilities. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external resources and installation instructions hosted on GitHub under the
inference-shorganization.
Audit Metadata