ai-rag-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a RAG architecture that fetches content from external sources (Tavily, Exa) and feeds it into Large Language Models, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data from web search results is captured in variables such as
$SEARCH_RESULT,$CONTENT, and$EVIDENCEwithinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The prompt templates use basic textual headers like 'Search Results:' and '== Overview ==', but they lack robust delimiters or instructions for the model to ignore potential commands embedded in the retrieved content.
- Capability inventory: The skill leverages the
beltCLI tool to execute various inference and search applications, which is documented in theallowed-toolsconfiguration. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content filtering, escaping, or validation performed on the external data before it is interpolated into the prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation and templates provide numerous examples of executing shell commands using the
beltCLI to interact with the Inference.sh platform. This includes operations for logging in, running search assistants, and invoking LLM models.
Audit Metadata