dialogue-audio
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes natural language prompts provided by the user which are interpolated into shell command arguments. This creates a surface where maliciously crafted input could attempt to influence the execution of the underlying CLI tool.
- Ingestion points: The
promptfield within the JSON payload for thebelt app runcommand found throughoutSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Input text is delimited by JSON property quotes and passed as part of a single-quoted shell argument.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to execute thebeltCLI utility. - Sanitization: The instructions do not define any sanitization, filtering, or validation logic for the input prompts before they are processed.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions guide the user to download installation scripts and add prerequisite skill components from external sources associated with the vendor.
- Evidence: References to
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.mdfor CLI setup and the installation of thebelt-sh/clicomponent. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is primarily configured to operate via the
beltCLI tool using theBashexecution environment, as limited by theallowed-toolsmetadata in the frontmatter.
Audit Metadata