google-veo
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external resources for tool installation and documentation, primarily targeting
inference.shand its official GitHub repository (inference-sh/skills). These are consistent with the skill's purpose as a wrapper for a specific service. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the use of the
beltCLI tool to interact with the API. It provides commands for logging in, searching for models, and running video generation jobs. These commands are standard for CLI-based service integration. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-provided prompts which are then sent to external AI models. While this presents an attack surface where malicious input could influence model output, it is the primary intended function of the skill and incorporates standard JSON structures for input passing.
- Ingestion points: User-defined prompts passed to the
--inputargument inSKILL.mdexamples. - Boundary markers: Prompts are encapsulated within JSON strings (e.g.,
{"prompt": "..."}). - Capability inventory: The skill uses the
beltCLI via theBashtool to perform network-based video generation. - Sanitization: Standard CLI argument passing is used; model-level safety filters from Google Veo are expected to handle content generation risks.
Audit Metadata