nano-banana
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is configured with a restricted environment via the
allowed-toolsfrontmatter, limiting shell execution specifically to thebeltcommand (Bash(belt *)). This follows the principle of least privilege by preventing the execution of arbitrary system commands. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of external components, specifically the
belt-sh/cliandinference-sh/skillspackages using thenpx skills addcommand. It also references installation documentation and image assets hosted on officialinference.shdomains and their associated GitHub repository. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests user-provided text prompts and external image URLs (e.g., in image editing workflows) which are then processed by the Gemini models.
- Ingestion points: The
promptandimagesparameters within the JSON payloads passed to thebeltCLI. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters are used in the instruction set to separate user data from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute the
beltCLI tool to interact with remote AI models and potentially fetch external images via URL. - Sanitization: Input validation and safety filtering are handled by the underlying
inference.shplatform and Google Gemini models rather than the skill's local instructions.
Audit Metadata