nano-banana

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is configured with a restricted environment via the allowed-tools frontmatter, limiting shell execution specifically to the belt command (Bash(belt *)). This follows the principle of least privilege by preventing the execution of arbitrary system commands.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of external components, specifically the belt-sh/cli and inference-sh/skills packages using the npx skills add command. It also references installation documentation and image assets hosted on official inference.sh domains and their associated GitHub repository.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests user-provided text prompts and external image URLs (e.g., in image editing workflows) which are then processed by the Gemini models.
  • Ingestion points: The prompt and images parameters within the JSON payloads passed to the belt CLI.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters are used in the instruction set to separate user data from system instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute the belt CLI tool to interact with remote AI models and potentially fetch external images via URL.
  • Sanitization: Input validation and safety filtering are handled by the underlying inference.sh platform and Google Gemini models rather than the skill's local instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 2, 2026, 02:21 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — nano-banana