newsletter-curation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external search results which could contain malicious instructions aimed at influencing the agent's behavior during newsletter generation or social media posting.
- Ingestion points: Web search results are retrieved from
tavily/search-assistantandexa/searchas described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the retrieved search content before processing it into a newsletter template.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
beltCLI viaBashto perform downstream operations such as creating social media posts (x/post-create) and generating images from HTML. - Sanitization: No sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content retrieved from external search providers is implemented prior to interpolation into the newsletter structure.
Audit Metadata