remotion-render
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user-controlled React/Remotion code through the
codeparameter and incorporates it into shell commands for execution via thebeltCLI tool. This creates a surface for potential instruction injection or shell breakout if the agent does not properly escape the input. - Ingestion points: The
codeandpropsfields within the skill's input schema inSKILL.mdaccept untrusted data from the user. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or safety headers to separate user-provided code from the command structure.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to executebelt app runcommands, which can be manipulated if the input is not sanitized. - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or escaping mechanisms are specified for the
codeinput before it is interpolated into the bash command. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the agent to download and install additional components and configuration files from external sources.
- Evidence: Instructions include
npx skills add belt-sh/cliand point to installation scripts hosted onraw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh. These resources are associated with the vendor's platform and are used for initialization. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary functionality relies on executing the
beltCLI tool via shell commands to process rendering requests.
Audit Metadata