web-search
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill enables retrieval of external data from arbitrary websites via Tavily and Exa extraction apps. As demonstrated in the LLM research workflow, this content is intended to be processed by an agent. This creates an attack surface where malicious instructions embedded in external web pages could influence the agent's logic.
- Ingestion points: Content is ingested from the web via
tavily/search-assistant,tavily/extract,exa/search, andexa/extractapps (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The provided examples use informal markers like
<search-results>and<content>, but do not include explicit system instructions to ignore embedded commands within the extracted data. - Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool restricted to thebeltCLI, which allows for further search, extraction, and local file writing (> search_results.json). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the extracted web content is defined in the instructions.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the installation of the
beltCLI tool and additional capability modules from the vendor's infrastructure, includingnpx skills add belt-sh/cliand downloads from theinference-shGitHub organization. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill leverages the
Bashtool to executebeltCLI commands. Theallowed-toolsconfiguration specifically limits this access to thebeltbinary, implementing a principle of least privilege for shell interactions.
Audit Metadata