camofox-on-replit
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill clones the
camofox-browserapplication fromgithub.com/jo-inc/camofox-browserand executes it usingnode server.js. It also downloads and runs a ~1.3GB Firefox-based browser engine vianpm run fetch-bininscripts/start-camofox.sh. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The provisioning process fetches application source code, npm packages, and large binary executables from non-whitelisted third-party sources during the
start-camofox.shsetup. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses various shell commands and scripts to manage the environment, including
git clone,npm install,uv venv, andnixutilities for library resolution and server management. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
generate-closure.shscript dynamically identifies system library paths usingnix path-infoandldd, writing them to a file which is subsequently used to setLD_LIBRARY_PATHfor the browser execution environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest data from bot-hardened websites, introducing a vulnerability surface where malicious site content could attempt to influence the agent's behavior. 1. Ingestion points: Web content retrieved through Camoufox tab sessions. 2. Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the scripts. 3. Capability inventory: Subprocess execution (node, python, nix), network requests, and workspace file writes. 4. Sanitization: The scripts do not perform specific sanitization or filtering on the scraped web data.
Audit Metadata