prd
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs shell commands for GitHub and Baidu iCafe using data (Title, Description) that originates from user-provided feature descriptions.
- Evidence: In
SKILL.mdunder Step 3.3, instructions define command strings likegh issue create --title "[Title]" --body "[Description + Acceptance Criteria]"andicafe-cli card create --space [SPACE] --title "[Title]" --description "[Description + Acceptance Criteria]". - Risk: If generated content contains shell metacharacters (e.g., backticks, semicolons, or command substitution), it could lead to unintended command execution on the host system during the issue creation phase.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: User-provided parameters are passed directly to shell commands during issue creation.
- Evidence: The
--spaceparameter for Baidu iCafe and target folder paths for local issue storage (passed tomkdir -p) are retrieved from the user and used as command arguments inSKILL.md. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface where untrusted user input is processed to generate content that governs subsequent shell command execution.
- Ingestion points: User feature descriptions provided at start (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or sanitization instructions are provided to the agent to escape shell-sensitive characters in the generated content.
- Capability inventory: Shell execution via
gh,icafe-cli, andmkdir -p(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The instructions lack specific guidance on sanitizing or validating generated strings before they are used as CLI arguments, although they do include a manual user review step as a mitigation.
Audit Metadata