crewai-developer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
PersistentWorkflowclass inreferences/advanced_patterns.mdutilizes thepicklemodule for saving and loading state to a local file (workflow_state.pkl). Specifically,pickle.load()is used, which is susceptible to arbitrary code execution if the serialized data is tampered with by an attacker. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: In
references/advanced_patterns.md, the MCP (Model Context Protocol) integration example demonstrates usingnpxto execute the@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystempackage directly. While this is an official package, the pattern involves fetching and running code from a remote registry at execution time. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes building agents that ingest data from untrusted external sources using tools such as
SerperDevToolfor search andScrapeWebsiteToolfor web scraping inSKILL.md. This creates a vulnerability where malicious content on external sites could contain instructions that hijack the agent's logic. - Ingestion points:
SerperDevTool,ScrapeWebsiteTool,WebsiteSearchTool,YoutubeSearchTool(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None implemented in the provided agent configuration examples to delimit external data from instructions.
- Capability inventory: Agents have the ability to write files (
output_fileinTask), execute arbitrary tools, and make network requests via built-in tools. - Sanitization: No evidence of input sanitization or output validation is present in the documentation for handling tool results.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation recommends the installation of several external Python packages including
crewaiandcrewai-toolsand suggests usingnpxfor fetching Node.js-based MCP servers. These are well-known resources but represent a dependency on external code repositories.
Audit Metadata