meta-campaign

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 21, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted content from various web sources to inform its campaign builder logic, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.\n- Ingestion points: Scrapes competitor ads from the Meta Ad Library, market research from Reddit, and user landing pages via WebFetch.\n- Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions in the scraped data.\n- Capability inventory: Access to agent-browser, WebSearch, WebFetch, and Gemini image generation.\n- Sanitization: External content is used to influence the final output without filtering or validation.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a shell command template that interpolates user-controlled variables, posing a risk of command injection.\n- Evidence: The bash script in Stage 00, Step 2 includes npx agent-browser open "https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/...&q=[competitor name or keyword]".\n- Risk: User-supplied keywords are not sanitized before being placed into the shell command, allowing for potential execution of arbitrary code if the input contains shell metacharacters.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 21, 2026, 04:55 PM