hookify

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses a subagent to analyze the conversation history (last 10-30 messages) to identify unwanted behaviors. This history is untrusted data that could contain adversarial instructions intended to influence the subagent's findings or the resulting rule generation.
  • Ingestion points: Conversation messages processed in Step 1 via the subagent prompt.
  • Boundary markers: The task instructions for the subagent define the scope, though specific delimiters for user messages are not explicitly defined.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can write files (write_to_file) to the .claude/ directory and execute local commands (mkdir, python3, ls) via run_command.
  • Sanitization: No specific sanitization or escaping is mentioned for the patterns extracted from the conversation, relying instead on user confirmation in Step 2.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to perform local system operations, such as creating directories (mkdir -p .claude) and running diagnostics in the troubleshooting section (python3 -c "import re; ...", ls). These are standard administrative tasks for the skill's functionality.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions require loading an external dependency (hookify:writing-rules) using the Skill tool to understand rule syntax. This indicates a modular dependency on another skill from the same provider.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 3, 2026, 10:58 AM