session-report
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the local directory
~/.claude/projects(or~/.gemini/config/projects), which contains the user's full AI interaction history. This data is highly sensitive and may contain source code, private configuration, or credentials discussed during sessions.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions inSKILL.mddirect the agent to take a user-supplied range and insert it into a shell command:node <skill-dir>/analyze-sessions.mjs --json --since <range>. This creates a command injection surface where a malicious user could execute arbitrary code by providing a payload containing shell metacharacters.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The generated HTML report includes actual prompt text and transcript context (neighboring messages) for expensive calls. This design facilitates the extraction of sensitive conversation data into a self-contained file, increasing the risk of accidental information disclosure if shared.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from historical session transcripts to generate a summary and detect anomalies.\n - Ingestion points: Session transcript files located at
~/.claude/projects/**.jsonl.\n - Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are provided to prevent the agent from following malicious instructions that may be embedded within the transcripts.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands, read/copy files, and modify local file content.\n
- Sanitization: There is no validation or sanitization of transcript content before it is analyzed by the agent for report generation.
Audit Metadata