claude-mem
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions recommend installing an external tool via
npx claude-mem installand a plugin from a third-party repositorythedotmack/claude-mem. These resources are hosted on public registries and are not associated with trusted organizations, posing a risk of downloading unverified code. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The use of
npxto install and execute theclaude-mempackage involves fetching code from the NPM registry and running it on the local system. Without a verified or trusted publisher, this constitutes remote code execution from an unverifiable source. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The core functionality of the skill—compressing and re-injecting conversation history and project context—presents an indirect prompt injection surface. Malicious instructions contained within the analyzed transcripts or project files could be stored in the memory snapshots and later influence the agent's behavior when the memory is loaded.
- Ingestion points: Conversation transcripts and project context extracted during the
/mem compresscommand as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The documentation does not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions to isolate historical memory from current session instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill interacts with the local filesystem (
.claude-mem/directory) to read and write memory snapshots. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content being compressed into memory.
Audit Metadata