ecc-workflow
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to perform global installations of NPM packages (
ecc-universalandecc-agentshield) from an unverified third-party GitHub repository (affaan-m/everything-claude-code). This practice introduces a supply chain risk, as the integrity of code from non-official or unvetted sources cannot be guaranteed. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The workflow incorporates the ingestion of external data via tools like
gh searchandagent-reachwithout explicit security boundaries. - Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from GitHub search results and external web sources during the Research & Reuse phase (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are provided to ensure the agent ignores potentially adversarial content within the fetched data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands, perform package installations, and interact with git repositories (SKILL.md).
- Sanitization: The skill lacks mentioned procedures for sanitizing or validating external content before it influences agent decision-making or code generation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill prescribes several shell commands for environment setup and operational tasks, including
npm install -g,git diff --cached, andgh search.
Audit Metadata