ecc-workflow

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to perform global installations of NPM packages (ecc-universal and ecc-agentshield) from an unverified third-party GitHub repository (affaan-m/everything-claude-code). This practice introduces a supply chain risk, as the integrity of code from non-official or unvetted sources cannot be guaranteed.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The workflow incorporates the ingestion of external data via tools like gh search and agent-reach without explicit security boundaries.
  • Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from GitHub search results and external web sources during the Research & Reuse phase (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are provided to ensure the agent ignores potentially adversarial content within the fetched data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands, perform package installations, and interact with git repositories (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks mentioned procedures for sanitizing or validating external content before it influences agent decision-making or code generation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill prescribes several shell commands for environment setup and operational tasks, including npm install -g, git diff --cached, and gh search.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 27, 2026, 09:04 PM