autograph
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.run()inscripts/orchestrate.pyandtests/test_autograph.pyto coordinate the execution of its various internal Python utility scripts. While the commands are constructed as lists and do not use a shell, this pattern involves dynamic invocation of local executables. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: In
scripts/enrich.py, the skill makes network requests toopenrouter.aito perform LLM-based tagging and link enrichment. This involves sending vault content to an external service.openrouter.aiis a well-known technology service for LLM access. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/common.pyusesyaml.load()with a customFrontmatterLoaderthat inherits fromyaml.SafeLoader. This is a safe implementation that prevents arbitrary code execution through YAML tags while allowing the parsing of complex vault metadata. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted markdown data from an Obsidian vault to extract entities, decisions, and relationships.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/daily.py,scripts/enforce.py, andscripts/graph.pyread the content of markdown files within the user's vault. - Boundary markers: The skill does not consistently apply clear delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when presenting extracted vault content to the agent or LLM for review.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to write to the file system (
Path.write_text) and execute internal scripts viasubprocess.run. - Sanitization: Metadata is sanitized via a
SafeLoader, but the natural language body of the notes is processed primarily through regular expressions and direct inclusion in LLM prompts.
Audit Metadata