blog-calendar
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data by scanning and reading existing blog files to determine content freshness and topic cluster status. An attacker could embed malicious instructions within the markdown or HTML files of a blog to influence the agent's behavior when the calendar is generated.
- Ingestion points: Step 1 and Step 2.5 of the workflow in
SKILL.mdinstruct the agent to useGlobandReadon*.md,*.mdx, and*.htmlfiles. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to prevent the agent from obeying instructions found within the scanned files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Write,Read, andWebFetchtools, which could be abused if an injection is successful. - Sanitization: The skill does not define any sanitization or validation routines for the data extracted from the blog posts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is configured with powerful tools including
Bash,Grep, andGlob. These tools are used to search for specific frontmatter fields (likelastUpdatedordate) and scan directory structures. While these are aligned with the skill's purpose of blog analysis, they represent a significant capability that could be targeted by command injection if file paths or content were maliciously crafted.
Audit Metadata