execute
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external issue trackers and planning specifications to define its execution plan.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads issue bodies and comments from trackers (e.g., GitHub Issues via
ghCLI) in steps 1 and 3 ofSKILL.mdto establish requirements and acceptance criteria. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are defined for the content fetched from the tracker.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including editing local files, creating/removing git worktrees, running arbitrary repository setup/check commands, and launching parallel sub-agents (workers).
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from external issue trackers before it is used to brief worker agents or generate plans.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to run repository-defined commands, which could lead to the execution of malicious scripts if the repository content is untrusted.
- Evidence: Step 5 and 8 in
SKILL.mdexplicitly instruct the agent to run "the repository's documented setup command", "focused checks", and "the project's development server script". - Context: While this is standard for development tools, it allows the repository configuration to dictate what code is executed on the host system.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill lists several dependencies that are loaded at runtime.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdreferencescode-cleanup,code-review,tdd, andtriagefrom thesnappedly/skillspackage. - Trust: These resources are from the same vendor as the skill author ('snappedly') and represent expected modular functionality.
Audit Metadata