skills/snappedly/skills/execute/Gen Agent Trust Hub

execute

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external issue trackers and planning specifications to define its execution plan.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads issue bodies and comments from trackers (e.g., GitHub Issues via gh CLI) in steps 1 and 3 of SKILL.md to establish requirements and acceptance criteria.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are defined for the content fetched from the tracker.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including editing local files, creating/removing git worktrees, running arbitrary repository setup/check commands, and launching parallel sub-agents (workers).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from external issue trackers before it is used to brief worker agents or generate plans.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to run repository-defined commands, which could lead to the execution of malicious scripts if the repository content is untrusted.
  • Evidence: Step 5 and 8 in SKILL.md explicitly instruct the agent to run "the repository's documented setup command", "focused checks", and "the project's development server script".
  • Context: While this is standard for development tools, it allows the repository configuration to dictate what code is executed on the host system.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill lists several dependencies that are loaded at runtime.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md references code-cleanup, code-review, tdd, and triage from the snappedly/skills package.
  • Trust: These resources are from the same vendor as the skill author ('snappedly') and represent expected modular functionality.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 29, 2026, 10:55 AM