check-agent-access
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
snowflake_sql_executetool to perform sensitive operations, specifically executingGRANTstatements to modify database access controls. This functionality requires the user to hold high-privilege roles such asSYSADMINorACCOUNTADMINand involves direct modification of the security environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill extracts dependency information from Cortex Agent specifications, including free-text
instructions. This creates a vulnerability surface where maliciously crafted instructions could lead the agent to audit or grant permissions on unintended database objects. - Ingestion points: Object FQNs are parsed from agent specifications retrieved via the
semantic_studiotool (specifically thecortex_agent_readaction). - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or safety warnings are implemented to distinguish agent-provided instructions from validated object names.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to run
SHOW GRANTSandGRANTcommands across the account viasnowflake_sql_execute. - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any validation or sanitization logic for the FQNs extracted from the agent's instructions.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a discrepancy in the author metadata; the README.md identifies the author as 'Martin Fleischmann', while SKILL.md and the LICENSE file identify the author as 'Martin Seifert'. While likely a simple error, such inconsistencies can be used to obscure ownership or bypass reputation checks.
Audit Metadata