grooming
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user-provided stories and acceptance criteria, which are untrusted data sources. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in the requirements text to influence the agent's actions.
- Ingestion points: User-provided stories and acceptance criteria processed in SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: The skill does not define explicit delimiters to isolate untrusted data from processing instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill writes to markdown files in 'docs/business/' and executes a Python script via the shell.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or input validation is performed on the ingested text.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes a local Python script using 'python3 /scripts/build_ac_index.py' to regenerate indices after updating requirements files.
- Evidence: Execution command found in the block of SKILL.md.
- Note: The use of a directory placeholder implies reliance on a pre-configured local tool environment.
Audit Metadata