longform-skill-distiller
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process large amounts of untrusted external data (books, transcripts, podcasts) to create new executable instructions.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Stage 0) andmethodology/02-stage1-parallel-extract.mdspecify reading external content such as PDFs, EPUBS, and transcripts supplied by the user or fetched from paths. - Boundary markers: The methodology uses the RIA++ framework to structure extraction, but there is no explicit instruction for the sub-agents to ignore or escape system-level command patterns that might be embedded within the source text.
- Capability inventory: The skill performs file system operations including reading files and writing new skills to the agent's configuration directories (
~/.claude/skills/or.cursor/skills/) as described inmethodology/07-stage5-deliver.md. - Sanitization: The process includes a 'Triple Verification' phase (Stage 1.5) and multiple human-in-the-loop confirmation checkpoints (Stages 0, 1.5, and 5) which serve to mitigate, but not entirely eliminate, the risk of malicious instructions persisting through the distillation process.
Audit Metadata