longform-skill-distiller

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process large amounts of untrusted external data (books, transcripts, podcasts) to create new executable instructions.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md (Stage 0) and methodology/02-stage1-parallel-extract.md specify reading external content such as PDFs, EPUBS, and transcripts supplied by the user or fetched from paths.
  • Boundary markers: The methodology uses the RIA++ framework to structure extraction, but there is no explicit instruction for the sub-agents to ignore or escape system-level command patterns that might be embedded within the source text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill performs file system operations including reading files and writing new skills to the agent's configuration directories (~/.claude/skills/ or .cursor/skills/) as described in methodology/07-stage5-deliver.md.
  • Sanitization: The process includes a 'Triple Verification' phase (Stage 1.5) and multiple human-in-the-loop confirmation checkpoints (Stages 0, 1.5, and 5) which serve to mitigate, but not entirely eliminate, the risk of malicious instructions persisting through the distillation process.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 5, 2026, 01:13 PM