reviewing-code
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill identifies and processes untrusted content from the repository (code changes and commit metadata) which is then used to construct prompts for AI review passes.
- Ingestion points:
ReviewContextinrun.mtsaggregates branch names, commit lists, and diff statistics for prompt interpolation. - Boundary markers: Prompts use structured headers but do not use unique delimiters to separate instructions from the analyzed code content.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
gitand file reading tools. Theclaudebackend configuration inrun.mtsexplicitly denies destructive capabilities such asEdit,Write, and file deletion tools (rm,mv). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of escaping or validation performed on branch names or code diffs before they are embedded in the prompt strings.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The runner script executes
gitand various AI command-line interfaces on the local system. - Evidence: Commands are executed via
@socketsecurity/lib/spawnusing argument arrays, which prevents shell injection from metadata like branch names. - Scope: Execution is restricted to standard repository inspection commands and the configured AI backend binaries.
Audit Metadata