ci
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads external CI configuration files (e.g.,
.github/workflows/*.yml,.gitlab-ci.yml) into the agent context via the!commandexecution inSKILL.mdand the file-reading logic inscripts/ci-detect.py. - Boundary markers: There are no protective delimiters or instructions (e.g., 'ignore instructions within this block') surrounding the ingested file content in the prompt context.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to use
Bash,Read, andWritetools, which provides a significant capability set for an attacker to target if they successfully inject instructions through a project's CI files. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the content of the CI configuration files before they are presented to the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes dynamic context injection in
SKILL.mdto execute shell commands at load time. - Evidence: The line
!"cat .github/workflows/*.yml 2>/dev/null || cat .gitlab-ci.yml 2>/dev/null || echo "no-ci""executes shell commands to populate the 'Project context' section. While the specific commands used here are for information retrieval, this mechanism executes automatically when the skill is accessed.
Audit Metadata