pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill automates several local CLI tools including
git,ruff,mypy,pytest, andgh. These tools are used for standard software development tasks such as checking code quality and interacting with the GitHub API. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a helper script
scripts/pr-summary.pythat executesgitcommands viasubprocess.run. The script employsshlex.splitand avoids using the shell (shell=False), which is a secure method for handling user-supplied arguments (like branch names) and prevents shell command injection. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes dynamic context injection in
SKILL.md(!git log ...) to provide the agent with recent commit history at load time. This execution is static and restricted to reading git logs. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. It ingests untrusted data in the form of git commit messages, which are then used by the agent to generate a PR summary. A malicious actor could craft a commit message containing instructions that attempt to override the agent's behavior during the summary generation phase.
- Ingestion points: Git commit history accessed via
scripts/pr-summary.pyand displayed through dynamic context. - Boundary markers: None. Commit messages are parsed into JSON and passed directly to the agent for processing.
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted access to the
Bash,Read, andGreptools, which could be misused if a prompt injection is successful. - Sanitization: No sanitization or content filtering is performed on the commit messages before they are processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata