video-to-superprompt

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides shell command templates for technical video inspection that directly interpolate the $VIDEO variable, which is sourced from user-provided paths or URLs.\n
  • Evidence: In SKILL.md, the workflow for technical inspection suggests executing ffprobe -v error -show_entries format=duration,size:stream=width,height,r_frame_rate -of json "$VIDEO" and ffmpeg -y -i "$VIDEO" -vf fps=1 /tmp/video-frames/frame-%03d.jpg.\n
  • Risk: If the agent environment executes these commands in a shell without proper escaping, a malicious filename containing characters like backticks or semicolons could result in arbitrary command execution on the host system.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external media files and URLs, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.\n
  • Ingestion points: The skill accepts local paths, uploaded files, and URLs provided by users as source videos for analysis (SKILL.md, Step 1).\n
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to isolate or ignore instructions that may be embedded in video metadata, subtitles, or content.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes powerful system tools including ffprobe, ffmpeg, and file system commands like mkdir (SKILL.md, Step 2).\n
  • Sanitization: The instructions lack any requirement for the agent to validate or sanitize input paths, filenames, or the content of the media before processing it with system utilities.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 29, 2026, 04:26 PM