webgl-3d-object
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHOBFUSCATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [OBFUSCATION]: The file
demo/index.htmlcontains a large Base64-encoded string assigned to the variableencodedHtml. This string encodes the entire structure, styling, and logic of the demo page, effectively hiding the implementation details from static inspection. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script within
demo/index.htmldecodes theencodedHtmlBase64 string at runtime and dynamically injects the result into thesrcdocattribute of an iframe. This method of executing decoded strings bypasses standard static code review processes. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The demo environment fetches several JavaScript runtime libraries and image assets. According to the
demo/source.jsonmanifest, these resources are sourced from well-known services including Cloudflare (for GSAP libraries), Iconify (for icons), and Supabase (for image storage). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions and demo prompts create an attack surface for indirect injection by processing external data and user-defined options.
- Ingestion points: The
initWebGL3DObjectfunction inSKILL.mdaccepts anoptionsobject for material and lighting properties.demo/PROMPT.mddirects the agent to fetch reference content from external URLs onneuform.ai. - Boundary markers: None detected; instructions do not include delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded commands in the fetched reference content.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses Three.js for WebGL rendering and
demo/index.htmlutilizes DOM manipulation and iframe injection viasrcdoc. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the
optionsobject or fetched external content was observed.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata