write-like-meng-on-x
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to execute shell commands with user-interpolated variables, such as
rg -n -i "<topic|product|resource|claim>". This creates a risk of command injection if the user provides malicious input that escapes the search string. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting live data from external sources (X.com) into its voice corpus.
- Ingestion points: Data is collected from
https://x.com/MengTovia an in-app browser and stored inreferences/tweet-corpus.jsonl. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to prevent it from obeying instructions that might be embedded within the collected tweet text.
- Capability inventory: The skill has broad capabilities including file system access (reading/writing the corpus), shell execution (running Git, Node.js, and Python commands), and network access (browsing X.com).
- Sanitization: The ingestion script
scripts/update-tweet-corpus.mjsperforms structural validation and deduplication but does not sanitize the text content for potential prompt injection payloads. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic execution of local scripts to maintain its state.
- Evidence includes execution of
node <skill-dir>/scripts/update-tweet-corpus.mjsto process new data. - It also calls an external script at
python3 <skill-creator-dir>/scripts/quick_validate.py, which is located outside the skill's own directory and depends on environment context.
Audit Metadata