write-like-meng-on-x

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to execute shell commands with user-interpolated variables, such as rg -n -i "<topic|product|resource|claim>". This creates a risk of command injection if the user provides malicious input that escapes the search string.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting live data from external sources (X.com) into its voice corpus.
  • Ingestion points: Data is collected from https://x.com/MengTo via an in-app browser and stored in references/tweet-corpus.jsonl.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to prevent it from obeying instructions that might be embedded within the collected tweet text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has broad capabilities including file system access (reading/writing the corpus), shell execution (running Git, Node.js, and Python commands), and network access (browsing X.com).
  • Sanitization: The ingestion script scripts/update-tweet-corpus.mjs performs structural validation and deduplication but does not sanitize the text content for potential prompt injection payloads.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic execution of local scripts to maintain its state.
  • Evidence includes execution of node <skill-dir>/scripts/update-tweet-corpus.mjs to process new data.
  • It also calls an external script at python3 <skill-creator-dir>/scripts/quick_validate.py, which is located outside the skill's own directory and depends on environment context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 29, 2026, 04:26 PM